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Abstract 
The article identifies a problem in socio-cultural-historical activity theory (SCHAT) with ignoring how hope and 
power constitute the theory itself, and suggests that this is why the tradition faces a bad choice between 
functionalist or utopianist reductions of its own social relevance. Currently, remedies for this kind of (perhaps 
shammed) innocence can be found in Foucauldian and Latourian approaches to knowledge. However, since 
these appear to presuppose the (often feigned) cynicism of a purely negative standpoint that fits all too smoothly 
into the neoliberal management it describes, this presents us with an impossible choice or oscillation at another 
level.To get beyond it, we need the frankly self-reflected standpoint of ideology critique and the articulation of 
‘concrete utopia’, i.e. real possibilities for social transformation. The approach is then realized and exemplified 
as part of an emergent practice research in the field of drug treatment. The field is broadly described as moving 
toward certain kinds of recognition of users’ standards, but also as filled with paradoxes that allow us to 
intervene with theory. One of these (sets of) paradoxes concerns the relations between state and civil (bourgeois) 
society that are played out in drug treatment. Contrary to the doxa of New Public Management, the (welfare) 
state’s normative power has not dissolved, only hides from itself. An immanent critique of practices and ideas in 
the field leads to the suggestion that its forms of recognition imply both submission of users, and the creation of 
positive standards and collectives. To intervene in this set of issues, we must expand the SCHAT reading of its 
own Hegelian-Marxist legacy, against the dominant liberal and scientistic trend, to engage with theories of 
recognition. A contemporary, participatory concept of recognition is sketched, which seeks to sublate (include 
and supersede) submission into the building of the generalizing ethics of a collective. 
Introduction 
 
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and 
rationally understood only as revolutionary practice 
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Marx, 3rd Thesis on Feuerbach 
In an epistemology of practice, it is only as ‘revolutionary practice’, as practice engaged in radical 
social transformation, that social theory can be what Uffe Juul Jensen (1999) calls “just-in-time”, that 
is, reflect itself as situated in Praxis and in History1, rather than either seeking to outline in the abstract 
the correct principles that ought to be implemented (as in Kant’s Enlightenment rationalism), or 
retreating to a futile looking back on socio-cultural transformations that led up to its own emergence (as 
in Hegel’s metaphor of philosophy as the “owl of Minerva [that] begins its flight only with the onset of 
dusk” {Hegel, 1968). 
But is ‘revolutionary’ really up-to-the-minute? In the summer of 2012, the term is much discredited in 
Denmark, as mainstream politicians use their media power to portray the Left as a crowd of outmoded, 
violent romantics. Some leftists acknowledge a need for modernization of terminology, and explain 
that the idea is not so extremist after all, while others maintain that it is precisely the radicalism of its 
social critique that, in these times of crisis (of economy as well as of economics), attracts such numbers 
to the Left that it has provoked a counter-attack; and that its long and sundry history should not be 
considered a flaw but a resource. 
In any case, what Derrida (1994) called the “work of mourning”, the reassessment of the Marxist 
legacy after 1989, is far from completed. One field where we have still some work to do is socio-
cultural-historical activity theory (SCHAT)2. Jensen’s article on a “philosophy just-in-time” did part of 
this work, by sketching how SCHAT researchers could articulate and realize an epistemology of 
practice with a specific reading of Marx’ Feuerbach Theses: Jensen’s Marx did not tear apart the 
relation of research to practice into two faintly connected regions: the description of (harmful or 
inevitable) states of affairs, and the identification of utopian essences. Instead, he proposed an 
immanent critique, a contentious articulation of real tendencies with which we might align our research 
in a struggle for social transformation3. 
The present argument seeks to continue this “work of mourning” in a way that addresses the issue of 
radicalism, or the revolutionary nature of this program. Although I shall portray it as neither romantic 
nor violent, it does crucially imply that hope and power belong to the relevance that defines social 
theory as a living practice – and that these are aspects that have not been sufficiently theorized in 
SCHAT. Thus, the article begins with a critique of ‘scientistic’ tendencies in SCHAT to underestimate 
power in order to protect a mostly unspoken hope. This makes it relevant to critically adopt approaches 
that focus precisely on power – in this case, those of Foucault and Latour – and so, the road is paved 
for a brief sketch of the overall framework of ideology critique. In line with the idea of an immanent 
critique, SCHAT is here understood to be a critical psychology: A kind of theory that can only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The capital letters and the spelling of Praxis with an x are meant to signify that these terms are conceived as in 
the broadly dialectical traditions, as demanding a radical de-centering of the analytic perspective. See 
Bernstein, 1971.   
2 I use the acronym SCHAT because the distinction sometimes made between ’socio-cultural’ and ’cultural-
historical’ activity theory is not relevant to the present discussion. As always, this homogenization of a 
complex tradition to ‘one theory’ is as problematic as it is inevitable.   
3 This is the Marx who would make clear that “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be 
established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which 
abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in 
existence” (Marx & Engels, 2000, p. 14). 
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establish conceptual foundations by relentlessly reworking bodies of knowledge or science that are at 
play in the practices it engages with – what Brown & Stenner (2009) call “creative and reflexive 
foundationalism”. So, in the latter part of this article, we shall engage with discourses and practices in 
the field of social work with drug users. This is meant to be both a vehicle and a measure: the field 
presents us with practices, objects and dilemmas that are taken as prototypical (cf. Nissen, 2009b; 
2012a), and are thus meant to help articulate problems and possibilities, as well as gauge their 
relevance.  
But allow me to first remind readers that we are among friends. The theories discussed here are only 
invited because they are all interesting and insightful conversation partners.  
Innocence or Cynicism 
Functionalism and utopianism: Two kinds of innocence 
Some versions of SCHAT share with most (other) discourses claiming some relevance for social work 
(or education) a Modern tendency to neglect or bracket precisely hope and power. This innocence 
seems to take two opposite forms, each as positions where people are struggling with the contradiction 
– functionalism and utopianism. 
We can identify functionalist tendencies in the widespread adoption and reformulation of Leontiev’s 
wishful convergence of the subject’s motive with social goals – such as in many analyses using 
Engeström’s triangular model of ‘activity system’ (1987; see also Langemeyer & Roth, 2006), or in 
Hedegaard’s theory of childhood practices (2011): The ‘social needs’ and ‘object-motives’ that the 
researcher identifies appear to be exempted from controversy as anonymous, objective forces that 
impose a logic on activity and thereby on subjectivity itself.  
Thus, to take one example, Hedegaard explains 
 
Leontiev’s theory of children’s activities starts with the concept of primary needs, but when a child’s need 
‘finds’ its object, the object becomes the need. From the newborn being an individual he/she becomes a 
personality through acquiring the object motives of society. (…) The activity of the subject is always directed 
towards the transformation of an object that is able to satisfy some specific need (Davydov et.al., 1983). Then 
the relation is turned around from being need – activity – object/motive and becomes object/motive – activity 
– need. It is through the child’s inclusion in social relations that this turnaround takes place (ibid, p. 16). 
Just as in sociological functionalisms such as that of Talcott Parsons (who draws on Freud for the 
purpose), this idea of a socialization presupposes a set of a-social ‘primary needs’ which are then 
somehow effaced or metamorphosed (sublimated) to converge as motives with the objects that can be 
defined through the structures of institutional practices4. Thus, it is easy to identify, by “following the 
actions” of Laura, a child of 10, a “social situation of development characterized by a leading motive – 
doing what you should do in school” (ibid, p. 23) – provided, of course, that we are not alerted by some 
deviance to search for other motives and thus activities.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I owe this critique of Leontiev’s functionalism and the role of his reductionistic concept of needs to Ute 
Osterkamp’s groundbreaking Motivationsforschung (1976).  
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Hedegaard’s interpretation of Laura’s “leading motive” to be “doing what you should do” is 
wonderfully blunt; yet, even as power stares us in the eye, we are in no way advised to consider it at all. 
Functionalism achieves its status as science by bracketing or ignoring the link between subjectivity and 
power: It presents itself as merely reconstructing how things work, whether as fulfillment of given 
tasks (as in Hedegaard’s analysis here) or as self-reproduction5. With concepts like ‘object-motive’, we 
seem to have a key to the autonomous workings, the machinery, of subjectivity – but the premises are 
set by the researcher, typically as relevant to a given practice and its management (e.g. theoretical 
knowledge as object-motive in school learning). We can also identify, here (most visibly in the works 
of Engeström and associates), the continuous struggle to get beyond this functionalism through the 
introduction of concepts such as contradiction, history etc. – concepts that, in this context, however, 
work as symptoms of the problem rather than its remedy, since they are designated as objects (i.e. as 
things that are dealt with) rather than constitutive of the practice of research itself. 
In opposition to this kind of functionalism, in Blunden’s recent theory of collaborative projects (2010) 
and in many applications of Lave & Wenger’s theory of communities of practice (1991), these units of 
analysis are established precisely as utopian spheres, as universally human in distinction from 
perversions that follow from illegitimate power (see also Nissen, 2011). Thus, here, power is in a way 
constitutive, but mostly as the impetus for the jump to an ‘innocent’ realm of practice (designated as 
collaboration, community, everyday life, situated learning etc.). This is then the truly human substance 
of activity, which figures as the alternative to existing oppressive formal structures, and at the same 
time is seen as more real than those structures as reproduced in mainstream theories. Again, here we 
find continuous attempts to deal with the contradiction, as numerous reminders of the external, 
empirical reality of conflict. Lave & Wenger’s book was even conceived as a way of dealing with 
community without denying power and conflict, even as it presented universal assumptions about a 
kind of situated learning and a kind of community that would be impeded by conflict and alienated by 
structure. Of course, the moment that such a community is specified, analyzed, put to some use (as 
what Jean-Luc Nancy, 1991, would call an ‘operative community’), then it has turned ‘structural’, and 
thus the contradiction reappears in full force as internal to the research itself, as the corruption of this 
research. The only way to avoid this seems to be retreating to dualist notions of purely analytical 
concepts that refer to nothing beyond becoming. Thus, in Jean Lave’s reflections on the concept of 
community of practice (2008), she claims that it was never meant to be a thing to look for, only a way 
of looking, and only a set of questions about something emerging but not existing. Yet, surely, if the 
implication is that the theory cannot grasp its realization, its objectivity, then we are left with a 
nominalism that sits very uneasily with her epistemology of practice.  
Lave’s retreat to a dualism that effectively defends the theory’s relevance by denying it brings it close 
to its seeming opposite: In philosophically reflected versions of functionalism such as those of Piaget, 
Luhmann, or Mintzberg, function is seen as purely ideal structure – a set of concepts that are internally 
related and only apply insofar as they apply, offered as a mere analytical frame – even if any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We can distinguish two kinds of functionalism, according to whether the unquestioned goal is external or 
internal to the system: Functionalism of task (linear) and functionalism of life (circular). Since the former can 
be elevated into the latter – as e.g. organizational tasks contribute to the reproduction of an organization – both 
are ‘system theories’ at bottom. But the question is never posed whether or why the overall system should 
survive, just as the mechanic does not need to know where the car he repairs is going, nor the doctor what is 
the meaning of the patient’s life (see Nissen, 2012a, ch. 3, p. 57 ff.).  
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application of the theory implies an impurity that would blow away the epistemological house of cards 
completely, were it not for the convenient division of labor that protects theories from their dubious 
relevance. 
Thus, the two positions share an attitude of assumed (or perhaps feigned) innocence, since power is 
treated as purely external to their theoretical work and core concepts. This positioning as innocent with 
reference to science as a special practice that is elevated from the concerns of (other) everyday 
practices and struggles, yet which still holds transcendent promises of truth and a better life, can be 
called scientistic. All through Modernity, scientism is a fairly understandable and widespread 
ideological form – since it expresses the internalist ethics of scientists – so it is no great surprise to see 
it even in traditions that seek to build on Marx.   
From the perspective of a radical epistemology of practice, the dualist and scientistic retreat to 
‘innocence’ can be regarded as an alienated (i.e. non-self-reflexive) expression of the theory’s 
relevance in radical social transformation, or ‘revolutionary practice’. Such abstract ideals can only be 
elevated (ascend) to the concrete in a process of alteration that involves the theorist herself and the 
questions she (pro-) poses. Jean Lave in fact realized this, and wrote her latest book (Lave, 2011) 
accordingly, as a (highly recommendable) reconstruction of her own process of apprenticeship in 
critical ethnography (even as she still seems to be trying to escape from the shadow of complicity by 
only rendering her own standpoint in extremely general terms).  
But many others do not, and the effect of the alienation is that the theories are read (sometimes by the 
theorists themselves) in realist terms, as reduced, imperfect or approximate reproductions of the given 
reality, with its existing conditions and structures of power, despite the alleged timelessness of ideal 
function and the imaginary eschatology of utopia. Behind this realism lies typically the unreflected 
scientistic Grand Narrative of a science-based Modernization – an image of radical change yet under 
preservation of socio-cultural and political foundations. 
Thus, the step to the seeming opposite standpoint of pragmatic realism, of an impure and cynical 
tactics, is not so long, after all. This step is performed everywhere, of course, and is what accounts for 
the relative prevalence of the theories. Regrettably, it is precisely that step which is the blind eye of the 
theories themselves. It is this blind eye that constitutes functionalism and utopianism. 
The supposed powerlessness of cynicism 
If we want to reflect it, we can learn from approaches to science studies that focus on just how 
knowledge is imbued with power. Foucauldian or Latourian critiques help us overcome the hypocrisy 
or self-deceit of the innocence of the functionalist / utopian Modernism in Academia. They remind us 
how humble and good-hearted academics have been key actors in the building of the modern world, 
with all its ugly aspects. Science, and this includes social theory, even critical social theory, even 
SCHAT – is of this world, it is powerful, and it is productive, far beyond the institutions of science 
themselves. If the concept of ‘power’ describes practices that objectify subjects and their activities (i.e. 
subject them to scrutiny and intervention), then power is at the root of all social theory. We are all in 
the business of social engineering – if by this we understand the science-mediated building of social 
life (and the ensuing struggles over whether that is done in technocratic or democratic ways)6. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I am aware that the term ‘social engineering’, to many readers, is exclusively pejorative. But I consider this 
linguistic convention to be part of a ‘standpoint of civil society’, an ideology that I want to help overcome: We 
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Retreating to ‘pure theory’ is impossible or, at least, it does not help us escape from the business. It 
only helps us ignore the impurity that gets our products sold, i.e. establishes relevance. Successful 
scientists, or social theorists, are those who can forge communities that link human and non-human, 
natural and cultural, subjective and objective entities, in new powerful ways.  
These are important lessons from the Foucauldian and Latourian traditions. But they seem to have 
come to their understanding at a heavy price: That of not being able or allowed to understand 
themselves in the very same terms. It all rests on the dodgy epistemological premise of a purely 
negative standpoint: A standpoint defined only by what it negates.  
In the account of itself, Foucauldianism can only ever deconstruct, open, refuse, disturb. We are never 
invited to reflect on the positivity of that negativity – what it produces, how it works as 
governmentality, how it shapes us. It is, paradoxically, the latest great and relatively successful attempt 
to escape from the very same inter-subjectivity of social research that it repeatedly declares as 
inescapable.  
Latourian social critique defines itself explicitly against social critique (e.g. Latour, 2004, 2005), and 
its theory is presented as non-theory (almost echoing what we know from the positivist attempts to 
reconstruct a psychology without metaphysics): abstract minimalist concepts such as “entities”, 
“networks”, “associations”, “actants” etc.  Latour reveals but repeats the unreflective Modernism of 
post-modernism, of wanting to clear away Modernism and replace it with something more true and 
untainted by false beliefs (Latour, 1993).  
Both traditions are post-Marxist in their rejection of the legacy of an ideology critique they regard as a 
naïve and elitist essentialism. They pride themselves of not claiming to hold any privileged truths or 
visions of a better life. Thus making much of how they have tied their own hands, like in some Houdini 
trick, they entice us to see the power that other social theorists ignore, even to the point where we can 
see little else… except we somehow come to overlook precisely the power of Foucauldianism and 
Latourianism. The reduction to pure power, that is to say, is not only a reaction to the Modern, 
scientistic pretense of ignoring it (the shammed innocence), but more fundamentally inscribed in the 
standpoint of post-structuralism and post-constructionism. 
Just as we saw above in the functionalist and utopianist currents of SCHAT, power is externalized as 
object, only here in a much more thoroughgoing way. Foucault universalizes and ’de-centers’ the 
concept of power as “actions upon other actions” (Foucault, 1982), abstracted from the singular, 
situated subjects who wield or is affected by that power. Similarly, at the core of Latour’s theory, and 
as such much debated in the ANT tradition, is a radically disembodied and ahistorical concept of 
power, in the shape of the autonomous construction of the world by the networking proclivities of 
entities with no (other) predicates. Either way, the question of the complicity of the theorist himself is 
avoided. It was an important step forward to expand the concept of power beyond what Foucault calls 
‘sovereign power’ – the Master’s rule by threat of death – and, conversely, to problematize the 
humanistic idealization of the subject as a pre-given absolute (cf. Nissen, in press); but little is achieved 
if we must remain with abstract discourses and networks.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
should engage in the struggles over that social engineering, rather define ourselves against it. It won’t go away. 
We’re part of it, and it’s part of ourselves. For this reason, I choose this odd, exoticizing terminology. See also 
Nissen, 2009a, 2012a.  
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This futile objectification of power is what defines these standpoints: When power is absolute and 
empty, all they can do is describe its mechanisms. Thus, powerlessness is internal to them when they 
think they have escaped it by conjuring up power as key and revealing its profanity. As they remain 
stuck with power itself as a negative abstraction, folding back any real future, any possibility of radical 
change, into the petty tactics of the present, they represent a pragmatic cynicism that is becoming 
extremely powerful as a way of dealing with the oscillations between the impure realism and the 
functionalist or utopian idealism we identified above. 
This is of course why these theories work so well in the mainstream education of public servants that is 
such a big part of our jobs. The ethos and the technology of New Public Management is much about the 
pragmatic handling of putatively democratic or scientific abstract ideals in disenchanted institutional 
landscapes – that is, in institutions that have lost the ethical reference that once governed them as 
organs of bureaucratic and/or welfare states – in the service of shifting constellations of powers and 
interests (cf. e.g. Du Gay, 2000). One ubiquitous and quite transparent example is the way that 
evidence-basing is performed and works as ‘evidence light’ in public management (more on this 
below): High-brow scientistic rhetoric combined with a pragmatics that shamelessly negates just that 
very same rhetoric, in the same moment it is spoken, performed by officials who are skilled both in 
science and in Foucauldian or Latourian meta-science.  
That kind of cynical discursive or constructionist reflexivity can swallow anything except itself. One 
cannot simply call the bluff and reveal the lack of substance or consistency, since, in a negative 
epistemology, this will only be taken as praise. But sometimes, with simple questions such as “So 
what?” or “What’s the point?”, one can call forth all sorts of authentic utopian ideals that have survived 
untouched, beneath the surface irony, to secretly fuel the whole thing. It may ring strangely, but maybe 
we should consider the idea that the Nietzschean cynicism adopted as self-understanding in much post-
structuralism is really an attempt to protect a soft core of an even more profound utopianism, or, in 
other words, a utopian horizon that has been pushed even more into the defensive, and as a result has 
become even more abstract and isolated, than that of the Marxist revolutionaries they mock so 
persistently… 
From abstract power to politics, ideology and hope 
My preliminary conclusion is this: without theorizing the utopia, or hopes, that fuel and guide our 
practices, including our theoretical and epistemological reflections, the exclusive focus on power is 
futile and just as self-deceptive as ignoring it. We have only come to be caught in another oscillation.  
How can we escape? One way is to continue the ‘work of mourning’ and dive deeper into the broadly 
dialectical tradition for ways to understand hope. In these traditions, it should be noted, the concept of 
hope is not disconnected from that of practice, as something one sits and waits for (as one could think 
on the basis of the Latin etymology of espérance). Jensen’s reflections on the timeliness of social 
theory echo Ernst Bloch’s discussion of the category of real possibility (Bloch, 1967, 1995). Following 
Bloch, since practice is always directed toward imagined futures, abstract utopia cannot be replaced by 
simple factuality – since, as we have seen, the two feed from each other in a vicious circle – but only 
by “concrete utopia” that articulate “real possibilities” for social transformation. 
To think in terms of such ‘real possibilities’ implies that the move to include the reflection of power as 
immanent to any practice and constitutive of subjectivity must connect with the political dimensions of 
these practices, for which that reflection itself may be emergently relevant. The (Modern) subject-
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position of research itself as engaged in social transformation and ‘social engineering’ (in the sense 
stated above) can no longer hide from itself.  
This requirement leads to a way of contextualizing social work practices in the current changes of 
power relations, discourses, and subjectivities, which is very different from the prevailing Foucauldian 
approach with its predominantly neutral and totalizing descriptions of micro-power and 
governmentality. Although we have learnt much from the Foucauldian broadening of the field of 
politics, far beyond ‘the political’ in the sense of political institutions, we can now also (or again) deal 
with political issues and concepts that the Foucauldians largely ignored, such as state sovereignty, 
recognition, equality and welfare.  
Going beyond abstract power as such also means facing questions regarding the constitution of singular 
subjects (as collectives, institutions and participants - not just as subject-positions), as well as the 
material dimensions of their practice (resources, artifacts, spaces, habits – not just abstractly declared 
materiality and arbitrary thingness). 
But above all, the concept of ideology, with its at once metaphysical and critical impetus – its reference 
to things that must be changed – and perhaps first of all its inter-subjective indexicality – its visibly 
situated standpoint – must be resurrected and reinserted into an epistemology of practice, that is, 
adopted and untied from the structuralist and psycho-analytic frameworks within which it has survived 
the past decades (e.g. in Højrup, 2003, or Žižek, 2004; see, to this, also Hänninen & Paldán, 1983, and 
Nissen, 2013). This is the cornerstone of a fruitful fusion of post-structuralism with SCHAT, because it 
reconnects the cultural-historical reflexivity of the former with the latter’s orientation to positivity, that 
is, to building consistent theory that is relevant for social transformation. 
Contrary to what we would expect from some recent portrayals (e.g. Latour, 2005), the naïve realism of 
the cartoon image of ideology critique – the idea of claiming Truth against a false consciousness 
determined by structure – has long since been left behind in theories of ideology. There is no need for 
the defensive retreat to a negative standpoint. The articulation of standpoint is, indeed, a critical 
diagnosis of ways in which subjects and collectives reproduce restricted forms of agency; yet, at the 
same time, it is always itself a construction of collective agency, and as such open to another round of 
ideology critique. It does not except itself from the field it engages with. This self-critical ethos is 
characteristic of contemporary discussions of ideology, such as the ones mentioned above. 
Bloch’s focus, the aspect of hope – the imagined futures that drive our practices at different levels – is a 
key to ideology, because it points to how collectives and subjects are not only constituted in discourse 
and power in the sense of a reproduction of a given form (in short, of function), but also and crucially 
in the meaning of potentials, of projects, of narrative projections. This is absent or only reflected in 
very limited forms, not only in post-structuralism and post-constructionism, but also in the structuralist 
and psycho-analytic conceptualizations of ideology; but it is strongly represented in narrative theory 
(e.g. Bruner, 1986; Mattingly, 2010; Mattingly, Jensen, & Throop, 2010). It is important because it is 
the point where our own interventions as social theorists could make a difference: A point of dialogue. 
The relevance of social theory is to provide ways to reflect and discuss how we are always oriented to 
transformations in what we do and what we are; not only transformations of Nature, but also of 
ourselves and our social world, and not only narrowly circumscribed relations or aspects, but also their 
wider and more radical presuppositions and implications. This latter sentence, in fact, is an attempt at a 
reformulation of Marx’s above quoted thesis about revolutionary practice.  
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I have written an extensive argument for this general approach in my recent book (Nissen, 2012a). The 
book bases primarily on dialogues with social work practices in the 1990s. In the following, I will try to 
exemplify the general points made above in my current field of empirical studies.  
Exemplary Field: Paradoxes of Drug Practices 
At the time of writing, we are at the early stages of a research project called SUBSTANce – Subjects 
and Standards7. The general point of the project is to study how subjects and standards create and 
perform each other, and to combine these studies closely with a systematic reflection on the role and 
impact of science itself. Basic socio-cultural-historical research into processes of standardization and 
subjectification points a way to bridging the existing gulf in research and intervention between, on the 
one hand, traditions for defining and using standards, and, on the other hand, traditions focusing on 
their description and critique. 
In one sub-project, we work in the field of social work interventions into drug use; we investigate and 
take part in producing standards of everyday life with or without drugs, and standards of addiction 
counseling.  
Recent trends in this field push toward recognizing users’ own standards of ‘recovery’, rather than the 
scientifically derived standards of health and state intervention (e.g. White, W. 2007; see also Houborg, 
2012, Nissen, 2012b). This takes several forms that sometimes fuse and at other times contradict or 
even work against each other: Eliciting user’s self-conceptions and preferences and arranging 
professional practice in relation to those (harm reduction, cognitive and client-centered counseling); 
managing intervention as something that resembles a contract-based and more or less commercial 
service (New Public Management); or leaving the problem – albeit often with state resources – to self-
help programs and volunteer programs.  
Since such ‘user-driven standards’ are often constructed either as arbitrary individual preferences or as 
pseudo-religious communities, they run into tensions with the at once social and scientific objectivity 
that defines disease and treatment (to this latter, see e.g. Jensen, 1987, Mol, 2002, Thorgaard, 2010). 
These tensions we find in a lot of places in the field, as what appears to be ‘effective’ liberal measures 
– typically described as ‘harm reduction’, such as the provision of substitute drugs – clash with 
traditional constellations of normativity, metaphysics, and knowledge that have been built into the 
institutions and professions of the welfare state (in health care, social work, education, penal and 
judicial institutions etc.).8 
However, it may be the case that this tension is gradually dissolving or at least moving. For instance, 
the definition of addiction in the WHO’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD) does not 
establish an unquestionable, objective standard that the health care professionals can refer to when they 
are challenged by users and managers. Rather, it outlines a field of contestation: Dependence is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See http://substance.ku.dk. The two defining concepts, ‘subjects’ and ‘standards’, each have a rich and 
contradictory theoretical history which we cannot review here. See e.g. Nissen, 2012a and Busch, 2011. Note 
that both can be viewed as constituted reflexively in culturally mediated practices – as subjectification and 
standardization. 
8 See Gomart (2004) for an example. A more subtle example is the widespread theory and method of 
“motivational interviewing” that pretends to build exclusively on users’ preferences yet aims at effective 
behavior change. See e.g. Connors, Donovan, & DiClemente (2001). 
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A cluster of behavioral, cognitive, and physiological phenomena that develop after repeated substance use 
and that typically include a strong desire to take the drug, difficulties in controlling its use, persisting in its 
use despite harmful consequences, a higher priority given to drug use than to other activities and obligations, 
increased tolerance, and sometimes a physical withdrawal state. 
(ICD-10 – F.10-19: Dependence syndrome)9 
What counts as a strong desire, harmful consequences, and higher priorities? Who decides and how? 
These are not just questions that belong to some radical academic critique; they are what any addiction 
counselor must deal with as a matter of routine. This routine must somehow unfold in common sense, 
at least a sense common to the counselor and the people involved – client, relatives, and so on. These 
diagnostic criteria cannot be operationalized merely by objectifying the client as a body; s/he must be 
subjectified, too, that is, recruited to participate in this objectification. 
In fact, it is plausible to say that the whole ICD conceptualization is gradually moving in the direction 
of common sense. All theoretical (etiological, causal, ontological) assumptions have been taken out of 
the diagnostic apparatus (cf. Bowker & Star, 1999, Timmermans & Berg, 2003). Yet, since theory 
remains immanent to any language and any practice, this really means that what has been taken out are 
those aspects of theory that stand out as different from common sense. 
This way, the global standards of drug health are really left to be defined pragmatically and locally. 
When treatment is evidence-based10, managers and users no longer have to engage with esoteric 
theories that struggle with and contain – inevitably: contrasting, controversial – metaphysical and 
normative ideas. It is narrowed down to purely instrumental relations of cause and effect that anyone 
can understand and manage for any purposes.  
Critics point out that such narrowly instrumental, evidence-based interventions (including the so-called 
“magic bullet drug” that cures the disease) not only still imply debatable theoretical assumptions, but 
even ironically reproduce the pattern of addiction itself (Sedgwick, 1993). It has been argued that it is 
precisely when we think of ourselves and how to deal with our complex problems in terms of isolated 
effects – in terms of ‘the fix’ – that we lose control (Bateson, 1972; Nissen, 2002). Further, there are 
many reasons to suppose that a strong condition underlying the current epidemic of addictions is the 
socio-cultural dislocation and individualization that is connected with modernity and free market 
societies (Alexander, 2008; Orford, 1992; Room, 1985). 
These tendencies and paradoxes have been described clearly by Foucauldians, mostly as expressions of 
the governmentality of neo-liberalism (e.g. Keane, 2011; Rose, 1996, 1999; Valverde, 1998). But this 
is where our simple question from above gets to be relevant: So what?   
Actually, in this field there has been developed an alternative kind of practice partly based on 
poststructuralist ideas: The narrative therapy tradition (White, M., 2005, 2007; Winslade & Cheshire, 
1997). That tradition is interesting, because it has been put forward precisely as a kind of critical 
psychology that identifies the problem in society, and in our “culture of consumption” (White, 1997). 
Further, it is an interesting feature of this tradition that it is deeply ambivalent toward the idea of effect. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Downloaded March 2013 from WHO’s website http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en#/F10-
F19  
10 Evidence-basing is the standardization of practices with reference to evidence of effect derived from scientific 
studies, mostly in the form of the so-called RCT, randomized controlled trial. See Timmermans & Berg, op.cit.  
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Mostly it stands opposite to the surge of evidence-based (cognitive) approaches by speaking of effect 
as the thickening of narratives and the ubiquitous postmodern ideal of opening some discursive 
multiplicity to agents. But it is not difficult to find examples of the fact that even that kind of therapy, 
in order to remain a therapy, must present itself as a cure. Those two ideas about effect are about as 
unconnected as Descartes’ res cogitans and res extensa.  
The narrative therapy tradition also exemplifies in its own way the oscillation or dichotomy between 
cynicism and utopianism that I outlined above. On the one hand, narrative therapy can be rendered 
cynically as a technology for the pointless pragmatic manipulation of various discourses or narratives, 
the main thrust of which appears to be the emancipation of the individual and the skillful fabrication of 
an artificial ideological common sense to underpin this autonomy. On the other hand, we can identify – 
and perhaps identify with – utopian collectives that define and espouse authentic common values, 
against the individualizing and victimizing discourses of psychology and psychiatry. And, 
unsurprisingly, we can find debates around the concept of power that are quite similar to the present 
text (Fisher, 2005). 
Thus we find here, in a nice, open and debatable way, some of the movements, chasms and paradoxes 
in relations between standard and subjectivity that our project seeks to investigate. 
Our project explores the production of ‘user-driven standards’ in counseling institutions for young drug 
users in two Danish cities. The professionals of U-Turn, an institution for young drug users in 
Copenhagen, are developing a ‘user-driven’ approach based on narrative therapy and similar 
methodologies, and struggle to align it with the top management’s demand for standardized 
documentation. Currently, the National Board of Social Services is disseminating the “U-Turn model” 
of intervention as a professional standard. We have a long history of collaboration with the U-Turn, and 
now we have begun to work with one of the local partners who are funded to implement the U-Turn 
model. 
This is full of paradoxes, since the U-Turn-model, as described on the website of the National Board of 
Social Services, is defined as an alternative, not only to the prevailing ideas about addiction, but also to 
the idea of standard methodologies. What we are looking at, and participating in, is the transfer of a 
model that is actually defined as not transferable. At the same time we study how prototypes of youth 
life with or without drugs are created, generalized and transferred between various users in the local 
field, with the help of the counselors and their more or less narrative methods that stress how each 
person’s narrative is unique. 
We are not in any way discouraged by these paradoxes. Developing a practice research collaboration 
includes looking for paradoxes or contradictions from where the exchange and mutual co-construction 
of innovative practice with critical research can take off (Motzkau, 2009; Nissen, 2009b).  
Let us look closer at one of them. 
State and Civil Society – Or: One Way That Drug Counseling 
Practices Can Be Revolutionary 
 
The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new materialism is human society 
or social humanity. 
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Marx, 10th Feuerbach Thesis 
I quote Marx’ 10th Feuerbach Thesis here because the specific paradox that I want to take up is about 
the relations between state and civil society. 
Note, first, that the term ‘civil society’ in Marx’ (as in Hegel) is translated from ‘bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft’, which could also be translated as ‘bourgeois society’; it is not only the voluntary sector 
and its associations, but includes industry and market. As such, it stands opposed to the state, and at the 
same time comprises the general social unit, the ‘society’ that the state seeks to understand, nourish and 
control. It has not been split up into the images of ‘good’ interactions of free citizens versus ‘bad’ 
corporate power. Marx’ standpoint of human society goes beyond the state, conceived as an instrument 
of the bourgeoisie (as Marx mostly conceived it), but it still stands opposed to a standpoint of civil / 
bourgeois society.  
In my view, after various historical lessons from the time since Marx, the debates around the place of 
the state in a progressive strategy can no more stick with a liberal anti-statism than with the 
conservative statism that Marx criticized in Hegel. Marx’ vision of the withering away of the state was 
(abstract) utopian and very unhelpful in the struggles that followed. All the places where some version 
and degree of socialism prevailed were also places where the state expanded far beyond the ‘night-
watch state’ of the middle 19th century and began to perform a (more or less democratic) ‘social 
engineering’ in the sense described above.  
Whether or not one agrees with my position on this, the political issue is important because 
reintroducing power into the framework of a cultural-historical approach means not only ‘activism’, but 
also (as mentioned) politics and the struggles over the building of state institutions.  
This should actually be no surprise to a researcher with a SCHAT background, since SCHAT studies 
have documented in many ways the ever more outspoken tendency that welfare state institutions form 
part of the networks and communities of people’s everyday lives. Thus, for instance, it is reasonable to 
regard today’s Scandinavian nuclear family as an extended family that includes kindergartens, schools, 
after-school facilities etc. (Fleer & Hedegaard, 2010; Højholt, 1999; Kousholt, 2011; Winther-
Lindqvist, 2009). This is a concrete instance of the state’s ‘engineering’ of the ‘social’ life of its 
citizens, and the SCHAT studies intervene in the struggles over how this is to be reflected and 
developed. And of course, this state expansion has not dropped down from the heavens in the first 
place; it has only been achieved through hard and creative work and tough (feminist and socialist) 
struggles. This has been and is a ‘revolutionary practice’ if ever there was one: Not in the sense of 
romantic violence and coups d’etat, but in the sense of transformations of fundamental aspects of our 
culture (such as family structure and gender relations). 
Currently, however, the New Public Management which is a strong ideology in the present governance 
of practices such as drug counseling (and in most other practices where a cultural-historical theory is 
relevant), is all about turning over state activities to civil society (in Marx’ sense) and treating other 
state activities as if they were civil society. New Public Management, in short, is governance from a 
standpoint of civil society.  
Like the kindergartens and schools, the work with ‘user-driven standards’ in drug counseling is a work 
of building welfare state collectives that go far beyond the ideology of New Public Management. In the 
counselors’ own language, we might say that this articulation of their work ‘thickens’ the story of 
narrative therapy so that we realize how co-creating narratives is a practical creation and a political 
Beyond Innocence and Cynicism   •   66 
	  
OUTLINES - CRITICAL PRACTICE STUDIES • Vol. 14, No. 2 • 2013 
http://www.outlines.dk 
struggle. The counselors may appear to be just (liberally) recognizing their users’ own ideas about 
youth life, family life, and drug use – more or less against or combined with a (conservative) 
sanctioning of given standards. This appearance is produced if their work is articulated in the most 
prevalent discourses of the field itself – the opposition of ‘harm reduction’ versus ‘control policies’ or 
‘law-and-order’ rhetoric. But in fact – that is, when articulated instead from a ‘standpoint of social 
humanity’ – they co-create the (social) everyday life of users. And they do it, to a large extent, in 
evolving and negotiated collaboration with not only users, but also professionals at other institutions 
such as schools, and with reference to social sciences, in a broad sense. 
Another useful way to think of this is to use Annemarie Mol’s (2008) distinction between articulating 
health practices according to the instrumentalistic and linear-causal “logic of choice” that is rising to 
dominance and threatens to erode the ethics of medical practice – and a “logic of care” that is oriented 
to enhancing health as concrete-general formations.  
Currently, the drug professionals have the problem that they must disguise the kind of productive work 
they do in the language of civil society, the “logic of choice”. So they either forget much of what they 
are doing, or they must keep double books (mostly both).  
The Standpoint of Civil Society Splits Recognition Into Choice and Surrender  
But the problem goes even further, and this is where we really run against the tide of ideology and at 
the same time must reconsider some basic assumptions in SCHAT. In other words, this is where the 
practices in this field can be taken as revolutionary in the sense that they transform basic aspects of our 
culture, including some that have defined the standpoint of research from which we ourselves have 
taken off – urging us to criticize in new ways the ideas of individual autonomy and agency. It is not 
only that we must add to the individualistic notions of autonomy some kind of contextuality and 
collectivity, as has always been a hallmark of SCHAT. It is also that the collective ‘social engineering’ 
of that contextuality – in a ‘logic of care’ – necessarily involves power, and that this entails moments of 
individuals' submission to collectives. 
This is precisely a point that is highlighted in a special way in the drug field, as we glimpsed above: 
The modern individualistic instrumentalism that is expressed in epidemics of addiction can be seen as 
the running amok of just that autonomy. In the largest mutual-help movement in the field, the 12 step 
movements and programs such as Narcotics Anonymous, this insight is foundational (Bateson, 1972; 
Mäkela et al., 1996; Narcotics Anonymous, 2003; 2008; Rice, 1996; Valverde, 1998, 2002). The basic 
idea is that the individual must realize that she is an addict, that she is powerless against the disease of 
‘addiction’ and has lost control of her life; and that she must surrender to something they call a ‘Higher 
Power’, which can be regarded as a symbolic, pseudo-religious representation of the community. Only 
through that submission can she be recognized ethically and in terms of the knowledge or experience 
that she has. 
However, the 12 step ideology is limited by the standpoint of civil society that was always 
constitutional to modern religious movements in the USA (a strong legacy in the 12 steps movements). 
The consequence is that it must stick with the stark, unmediated contrast between on the one hand this 
surrender, and on the other hand the insistence that the person must choose it herself.  
Further, often members at one and the same time have a deep-rooted belief in the authenticity of their 
addict identity and the necessity of surrender – and a postmodern ironic and pragmatic approach to it. 
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In fact, one can trace a pragmatic aspect deeply in the 12 step literature and rituals (cf. Narcotics 
Anonymous, 2003; Valverde, 2002). One striking example is Jacob Hilden Winsløw, a social 
constructivist sociologist in the field with some national fame (Winsløw, 1984, 1991) who suddenly 
came out as member of the NA. When asked about how he, as a social constructivist, could live with 
the crude essentialism of NA’s concept of disease, he simply answered: “It works for me!”  
Indeed, “It works – if you work it!”, as the NA motto goes. The tautology that defines the collective at 
the same time conceals what it is that works and under which conditions. The problem that in fact 
many people choose to drop out, and why they do, becomes hidden because the language of the 
movement simply cannot challenge the basic premise of the standpoint of civil society, the ‘if’ in the 
motto: the autonomy of free choice. This is all the more paradoxical since the movement itself bases on 
a critique of the radically abstract, thin nature of that autonomy, when it is regarded in the shadow of 
the ‘disease’. Conversely, the standard and ritualized logic of the motto’s ‘it’ is reified and rendered 
absolute, so that it cannot be conceptualized how ‘it’ is in fact continuously made and remade by its 
members. 
The same dichotomy of choice vs. standard characterizes most sociological studies of the movement. 
Like most sociology, they accept as given the civil society premise of individual agency in society and 
thus some version of the classical Tönnies’ian community / association division (see, to this, Nissen, 
2012a, ch. 3). Either the community is taken as given in a premodern fashion (which appears to explain 
the religious aspects), or it is an association chosen as a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ package. Thus, even 
though some do point to the creation of communities of care as central (Leighton, 2006; Rice, 1996), 
the 12 step movement is generally accepted as a free association of citizens, and its ’12 traditions’ that 
codify this status are taken at face value (Mäkela et al., 1996). There is one strand that reveals how NA 
(in the USA) cannot really be considered a free civil society movement, since it has become an integral 
part of the state’s coercive measures – e.g. membership is a requirement for help, prison parole, or even 
parenting (Peele, Bufe, & Brodsky, 2000; Carr, 2011) – but here, the implied suggestion is that citizens 
should be emancipated from such illegitimate coercion.  
Of course, there is ample evidence of the failure of coercive measures per se, especially in weak, 
residual welfare states like the USA. But, however well-founded, these liberal critiques only send us 
back to square one, the ‘first of 12 steps’ question: What if the individual autonomy that we seek to 
defend is part of the problem, and some kind of surrender to the ‘higher power’ of some collective is in 
fact crucial to any solution? 
This question is not only relevant in the approach to pseudo-religious mutual-help civil society 
communities; on the contrary, the almost universal rise to prominence of these communities, and their 
increasing infiltration with state powers and state institutions, urge us to consider the more general 
implications11. Thus, to phrase it in more general terms: How can we articulate the recognition of drug 
users in ways that include power relations and moments of submission, along with the drug users’ 
participation in transforming the institutions to which they surrender? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 All the more so in welfare states such as Denmark where this infiltration is much more than simply coercive: 
Most (state financed) drug-free residential treatment are based on, or heavily influenced by, the 12 step 
program, 12 step members abound as staff in state institutions etc. 
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Adopting Hegel’s theory of recognition 
One obvious way is to dig up – as part of our Derrida’ian “work of mourning” – Marx’ Hegelian 
legacy. The idea that recognition proceeds through a moment of submission goes back at least to 
Hegel’s so-called ‘dialectics of recognition’ or “Master and Bondsman” chapter in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit (Hegel, 2004, ch. IV A)12.  
Hegel’s concept of recognition has been read and interpreted mostly in terms of some kind of Kantian 
formal universalism – a political correctness that deprives it of its emphasis on power or even reduces it 
to some version of the very ethics of individual subjective authenticity or rationality that Hegel spent 
much of his life criticizing (e.g. Fraser, 2000). Or conversely, as an early version of the Freudian drama 
of socialization that leaves the subject forever in alterity, not quite recognized, in relation to a static 
social structure personalized as the Father Figure or the Big Other (Butler, 1997, Žižek, 1999). On this 
background, it is quite understandable that many SCHAT and poststructuralists try to avoid the issue 
altogether if they do not relapse to a simple liberal particularism. 
But some contemporary scholars of Hegel’s theory of recognition (Butler, 1997; Højrup, 2003; 
Musaeus, 2005; Taylor, 1975, 1995; Williams, 1997; Žižek, 1999) can help us understand recognition 
in ways that are more compatible with an epistemology of practice, and which can help us theorize 
power and get over tendencies to functionalism or utopianism – even if at many points a further critical 
theoretical discussion would of course be useful13. 
This theoretical project is complex, and really doing it justice would take us far beyond the limits of 
this article (I have unfolded it a bit more in Nissen, 2012a, ch. 7 and 8). But let us consider it for a page 
or two. 
The most important points that should be taken from it all have to do with its dialectical character: 
Although Hegel’s’ text is quite opaque, it clearly presents a development through opposing moments, 
such that an initial, superficial recognition is turned around into an existentially precarious submission, 
and then gets to be re-substantiated through the implications of that negation, which unfold as a labor 
that is alienated, but also productive and cultivating, eventually to overcome its alienation. In Hegel’s 
dialectic, even if a tool – such as a slave is supposed to be a mere tool for the master – is projected as 
no more than a means to an end, the realization of the intention in practice always involves more, and 
includes a reconstruction of the ends14. This is referred to as the ‘cunning of reason’.  
Although Hegel presents recognition as the relation of one “consciousness” to another, in the present 
reading, it is basically participatory (the philosophical case for this wider conceptualization is made, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Axel Honneth (1995) argues that we should rather build on Hegel’s earlier works that are not as troubled by 
his ambitions to a grand totalizing scheme. However, I suggest that we follow the argument of Williams 
(1997), Højrup (2003) and others that Hegel’s concept of recognition should be read through his more unfolded 
social theory of his later works, since that mediation is key to its dialectics. 
13 This even includes the psychoanalysts: although Butler and Žižek largely ignore praxis and participation, and 
remain within the misleading Freudian metaphor, they also work consistently to open the issue of recognition 
to politics, and, even more importantly, they help us see that recognition is existentially vital to subjectivity, 
connected with the very constitution of reflexive subjectivity. Another route to this insight could be the 
existentialist, from Hegel through Kierkegaard and Sartre. 
14 This is a basic point in dialectics that has to be remade over and over. Thus, Latour (2002) makes the same 
point under the nice title “The end of the means”. 
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among others, by Williams, 1997). The relation ‘I – You’ always implies a ‘We’, and thus an ‘Us’ etc. 
This means that a crucial form is the collective’s recognition of the participant. In Althusser’s (1994) 
term, the participant is ‘interpellated’, recruited as potentially identical with the collective and its 
subject-positions (‘in God’s image’), and thus submits to participating in a given ideological form. This 
point implies an inter-subjective or “power” aspect of the process of acquisition, a moment of clash of 
wills and eventual submission, as a necessary element in the constitution of the individual subject as 
self-reflexive. Subjection is realized when the individual takes on the ideological form and participates 
in treating herself as an object (in a kind of ‘zone of proximal development’ of selfhood). Thus, in this 
theory, agency, when specified as recognized and self-reflexive, does in fact emerge through a moment 
of submission15. This point is similar to Foucault’s theory – although long before him, Kierkegaard, 
G.H. Mead and others had also taken it up from Hegel (and transformed it in different ways) – but it 
reinserts it in the framework of participation, ideology, and dialectics.   
One implication of adopting this wider framework is that through her participation, the individual 
inevitably changes the collective in a ‘cunning of reason’. In Althusser’s example, a child is born into a 
pre-given position in a family, with her name already given. What Althusser does not mention, 
however, but as any parent knows, the child changes, reconstitutes the family in the same process. This 
points to the transformations of the mutuality of recognition: Recognition must include some kind of 
fusion of horizons, but not simply as common sense; rather, the initial moment of external 
(symmetrical) recognition of the Other (in common sense) is negated in a moment of (asymmetrical) 
submission, but this is then, in turn, negated in a reconstruction of common meaning that performs a 
critique or transformation of common sense. Note that this way of articulating the dialectics of 
recognition implies a reinterpretation of the sense/meaning distinction that Vygotsky and Leontiev took 
up from Paulhan and Frege (see Nissen, 2012a, ch. 5). 
The productive transformation of sense to meaning implies the generalizing nature of recognition: As 
mentioned, recognition always implies more than a relation of one subject with another. It unfolds 
rather as the building of the realized generalizing ethics of a collective. Although recognition 
constitutes autonomy, it is never absolute, but a precarious autonomy that is founded on a 
universalizing ethics that substantiate it, and which is itself expanded in the process. This realized 
universalism is in fact a positive definition of a state, a political unit. 
In other words, this reading highlights the mediated nature of recognition as key to its dialectics. In the 
SCHAT tradition, mediation is mostly known as the essential involvement of cultural meanings that are 
neither just free-floating semantic structures, discourses, or standards, nor simply fixed symbols 
regulating inter-subjective relations and interactions, but which relate these moments with one another 
productively through their externalization in material objects.  
Thus, for example, the concept of ‘user’ is a discursive element and the form of a set of social relations 
that are objectified in texts that regulate certain contemporary drug treatment institutions, in websites, 
office buildings, scientific models etc. This is then the common sense in terms of which clients and 
counselors meet and do treatment, and which is continuously reproduced … but which is also 
continuously broken up and transformed as meaning, as ‘real possibilities’ in practices that can be 
articulated critically with some concept of a “logic of care” as opposed to a (neo-liberal) “logic of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Thus, this marks a difference to the – otherwise at many points convergent – critique of Foucault and 
governmentality studies in Langemeyer, 2007. 
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choice”. The client submits to an interpellation as a ‘user’ (and the counselor to one as ‘service-
provider’), but the practice of counseling calls forward other aspects that point beyond those identities. 
And the realization of those potentials then requires dealing critically with the institutional regulations 
that objectify the common sense “logic of choice”. In the process, the common sense of treatment is 
transformed as, for instance, the meaning of ‘narrative practice’ that implies the construction of 
‘communities of concern’ (White, M., 1997), in which the ‘user’ is reconstituted as participant.  
But – less discussed in SCHAT - mediation also implies the internal relations and entanglements of 
practices and collectives across their temporal and spatial extensions. Thus, for instance, counseling 
only makes sense in its relation to an everyday life elsewhere and to the hope of future personal 
development or cure (as highlighted in the narrative tradition); and the ethics of a social welfare state is 
articulated on the horizon of a certain collective hope, or utopia (of which the idea of ‘communities of 
concern’ forms part). On this basis, it recognizes ‘users’ and other subjects in their potentiality rather 
than their factuality.  
All in all, the recognition that appears superficial at first, can push toward a deeper and more mutual 
kind of humanism that implies what Mattingly (2010) calls a “blues hope”, a hope that requires radical 
change, of participant subjects as well as of collectives. The ‘requirement’ is of course never 
guaranteed. The processes described here are always precarious. But that is just why we – as social 
theorists and / or as psychologists – can intervene, and think of what we do as ‘just in time’. 
--- 
I suppose that some readers will find it frustrating that such a huge philosophical discussion is taken up 
– and of course, only given a sketchy treatment – at this point. But if a transformative activist stance 
means engaging with revolutionary practices, then we are sure to be confronted with such big issues. 
Social theory gets to be ‘just in time’ only by mediating such theoretical discussions, their complex 
histories and contentious hopes, with current practical and political problems – and vice versa. Allow 
me again to refer to the slightly more unfolded arguments in Nissen (2012a, 2013), and of course to the 
philosophical works referenced. 
Beyond Neo-Liberal Standardization and its Others 
The theoretical approach outlined in the previous section is relevant because it may provide us with 
ways of engaging with the troublesome issue that the practices of addiction prevention and treatment 
are the building of state institutions that actually include the wielding of power and only achieve a 
substantial recognition of users through their partial submission – as well as through the substantial 
transformation of state institutions that it will entail. 
This is directly opposite to ruling ideas: The disguise or mock restructuring of state intervention as 
standard commodities for users or consumers of a civil society, and the emergence of international 
regulating institutions and discourses that facilitate this (such as the ICD). As we have seen, the 
structure and standpoint of civil society splits up recognition in the user’s free choice and her absolute 
surrender to the standard. In relation to the social problem of addictions, adopting this policy is like 
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trying to quench a fire with gasoline16, and in terms of formal governance, it even fails to meet its own 
purported standards: Visibly coercive and ineffective interventions abound (Bergmark, 2005; Carr, 
2011). Whenever such ‘scandals’ are revealed, however, the likely reaction is another round of 
standardization. 
The dialectical approach to recognition only breaks this cycle by going beyond the abstract universals 
of standardization. This is not achieved by inverting these universals into either particulars or a blank 
indetermination – by differentiating or rejecting standards – since such inversions are already intrinsic 
to standardization and New Public Management (cf. to this Busch, 2011)17. Rather, true ‘user-driven 
standards’ must evolve as concrete universals, that is, situated institutions that embody the collective 
ethics of a ‘logic of care’, as they provide material conditions, as they apply power, and as they both 
result from and facilitate negotiation, debate, and theoretically informed knowledge.  
The activist participatory stance in this field, then, assumes a standpoint of social humanity that is 
concretized as the building of state institutions that embody ‘user driven standards’ and thus perform 
recognition in the more unfolded, mediated sense sketched above.  
As ‘concrete utopia’ in Ernst Bloch’s sense, such ‘user-driven standards’ are already emerging, as 
tendencies in 12 step and other recovery communities, in narrative counseling, and many other 
practices18, if we take care to articulate and develop them in relevant ways, and do not shy away from 
the political struggles this entails (see, as examples of this, in the field of drug interventions, Nissen, 
2009, 2013, 2012b). 
Beyond the Liberal Utopianism of Marxism 
But it also entails the political debate I mentioned above. In my view, we must finally dispense with the 
liberal utopianism that has always been part of Marxism, too. Even Marx and Engels – probably 
reacting to what they saw as Hegel’s conservative statism – would nurture the idea that there is some 
kind of untainted community (or we could call it ‘activity’) below the dirty superstructures of state and 
ideology, where the “real individuals” can be seen “empirically” to engage with each other and with 
nature (Marx & Engels, 2000). 
To some extent the program of SCHAT has been the attempt to flesh out that vision. As we saw, this 
can be regarded as part of a wider scientistic tendency. But it has also formed part of the anti-statist 
utopian current that has impeded the socialist movements’ reflection of their own political projects, and 
the disasters related to how they necessarily assumed the form of state power, even as they envisioned a 
“standpoint of social humanity”. This may be another reason why SCHAT has struggled so much with 
the functionalism / utopianism dichotomy that I mentioned at the start. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In passing, let me note that this is very much like the so-called ‘austerity measures’ where the current financial 
crisis that has developed because of an increasingly deregulated capitalism is met with further cutbacks and 
weakening of the states, first of all the already weak states such as those of Southern Europe. 
17 Here we encounter another vicious cycle, the ’bad infinity’ of simplicity and complexity. Much contemporary 
critical psychology and social science appear to be content with flipping the coin of reductionism by merely 
invoking multiplicity, diversity, heterogeneity, etc. 
18 Even in some kinds of evidence-based policies that strive toward the utopian vision of a social engineering of 
the whole community – cf. the interpretation of Cochrane and his followers in Jensen, 2007, and Thorgaard, 
2010. 
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In any case, if SCHAT is to take up its other side, its activist participatory stance, then it has got to 
develop ways to include a theorizing of power and utopia, in ways that go beyond not only the pretense 
of innocence, but just as much the pretense of cynicism. 
This article was one attempt to push in that direction. 
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